Automation Is Expanding Cyber Risk in Oil and Gas

Automation is now a core part of oil and gas operations. Companies are expanding the use of remote operations, real-time optimization, and AI-based decision systems to improve efficiency and reduce operational costs. But these same technologies, by design, introduce more IT dependencies: more remote access points, more software layers, and more connected systems.

Each of these creates a new potential vector for attackers to influence physical operations. As control of pumps, compressors, and electrical systems shifts to centralized software environments, the risk shifts with it, from isolated faults to coordinated disruptions that begin in IT and play out in the physical world.

This trend is only accelerating. According to Deloitte’s 2025 Smart Manufacturing Survey[i], 86 percent of energy and industrial companies are increasing their investments in automation and digital infrastructure over the next 24 months.

Traditional cybersecurity tools are not built to address this type of risk. They monitor the network, PLC/SCADA systems, or the HMI, but they have no direct insight into the physical process itself. This is where process-oriented OT cybersecurity comes in. By monitoring Level 0 – the real-time electrical and mechanical signals – operators gain independent visibility into what is happening in the field, even if the control system has been compromised.

In an environment where automation is expanding rapidly, this kind of process-layer validation is the only way to ensure that critical infrastructure is operating safely and securely.

What’s Driving Automation — and Why Now

Automation in oil and gas is accelerating in response to consistent pressures: workforce shortages, cost management, infrastructure modernization, and regulatory demands for efficiency and environmental compliance. Companies are deploying remote control systems, advanced analytics, and robotics to meet these challenges head-on.

At the industry’s flagship energy summit, CERAWeek 2025 in Houston, executives emphasized the impact of these tools. [ii] AI is being used to steer drill bits and anticipate well problems, enabling more wells to be drilled annually with better capital efficiency. Artificial intelligence–driven drones are remotely monitoring operations, helping to reduce maintenance downtime

The push toward automation is not slowing – and neither is the urgency to defend against the expanding cybersecurity risks that come with it.

Why This Matters for Cybersecurity Now

As automation increases within the oil and gas sector, so does the digital surface area exposed to cyber threats. This isn’t hypothetical. Recent research shows that ransomware attacks against the oil and gas sector rose by 935% year over year, a spike that is (at least) partially attributable to increased digitization and connectivity.

We’re seeing evidence of this in the data. According to a 2025 Honeywell report, ransomware attacks targeting industrial operators – including oil and gas – surged by 46% in just one quarter, while credential-stealing malware attacks rose by over 3,000% (not a typo). These trends point to a growing risk landscape as more systems become digitally connected and remotely accessible.

Although publicly available data reports rarely name automation explicitly as the point of failure, the correlation is increasingly hard to ignore. Many oil and gas operators are running complex architectures that integrate AI-based analytics, automated process control, and remote instrumentation. Often without corresponding upgrades in visibility or segmentation. This creates more entry points for attackers, more ways for malware to spread, and more opportunities for subtle attacks to slip from IT into physical infrastructure undetected.

This isn’t simply about ransomware encrypting files. It’s about how increased connectivity between business systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is expanding exposure across known attack paths. That exposure creates conditions for threats that begin in IT to move through the ICS environment and reach the physical process layer – the core of oil and gas operations.

From IT Access to Physical Consequence: A Plausible Attack Chain in Oil and Gas

The media and analysts typically don’t trace a cyber incident all the way to the physical process level. But in highly automated oil and gas environments, the conditions already exist for this kind of progression. A threat that starts on the business side can move through the control system and interfere with physical operations, without ever triggering alarms or showing signs of disruption in the software layer.

The diagram below outlines a plausible attack path, based on real-world techniques observed across industrial sectors. It shows how an attacker can influence operational equipment by compromising control logic, without damaging hardware or causing a system crash.

Diagram 1: From Business Network to Process Disruption – An Oil and Gas Attack Chain

The sequence below illustrates how an attacker could move from initial access to manipulation of field equipment, without triggering alarms or alerts:

Initial compromise: A phishing email or third-party credential leak provides access to a business-side workstation.

Malware deployment: Remote access tools or automation scripts are installed, giving the attacker persistent access.

Pivot to OT network: The compromised PC is connected to an HMI or engineering workstation that bridges to the control network.

Access to control interfaces: The attacker uses stored credentials, trusted connections, or misconfigured access controls to reach automation servers, SCADA interfaces, or engineering workstations that manage field equipment.

Network discovery: Internal scanning reveals the structure of control networks, including safety systems, instrumentation, and field-level devices.

Control logic manipulation: Logic is modified to suppress alarms, delay interlocks, or override normal behavior—causing equipment to respond incorrectly while the system reports normal status.

The Visibility Gap That Enables Physical Compromise

In this scenario, everything appears normal within the control environment. SCADA logs confirm that commands were issued. HMIs display healthy status. Redundancy systems remain on standby. Yet in the field, the equipment behaves differently: a pump never draws current, a valve stays open too long, or a compressor fails to start.

The issue lies within the automation logic – the rules that determine how and when equipment should respond. If those rules are manipulated, and there is no direct view into what actually happened on the ground, operators are effectively blind.

This is where process-oriented monitoring closes the gap. By capturing out-of-band signal data directly from physical infrastructure, it confirms whether actions occurred as intended. It doesn’t rely on what the ICS says happened. It confirms what actually did.

How Process-Oriented Monitoring Works

Process-oriented OT cybersecurity (also known as Level 0 monitoring) provides a fundamentally different layer of protection. Instead of relying on network traffic analysis or controller logs, it monitors the raw electrical signals at the core of industrial operations.

This monitoring is fully out-of-band, meaning it operates independently from the control system and cannot be bypassed or manipulated by compromised logic, software, or spoofed inputs.

What it monitors includes:

— Analog and digital input/output (I/O) signals at the controller level

— Electrical activity tied to field equipment such as pumps, valves, actuators, and compressors

— Deviations between expected and actual signal behavior, which may indicate failures, overrides, or malicious manipulation

These signals are captured directly from the physical control layer and cannot be altered by malicious code or false reporting.

In short, this approach does not trust ICS reporting. It independently verifies what’s happening where it matters most: at the electrical interface between automation logic and physical machinery.

Conclusion: From Automation to Assurance

Automation is deeply integrated in the core of oil and gas operations. It brings speed, efficiency, and scale, but it also increases exposure. As control systems become more connected, integrated, and externally accessible, the risk grows that cyberattacks can move invisibly through trusted infrastructure.

Manipulated logic often produces no alarms. The industrial controls may show normal conditions even as field equipment behaves unpredictably. Without independent validation at the process layer, inconsistencies may be hidden – until they result in downtime, safety incidents, or worse.

Process-oriented monitoring offers a direct, physics-based view into operational behavior. In the era of automation, it’s not an add-on. t’s the final layer of defense when trust in software alone is not enough.